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An important accomplishment of international economics in the past
decade has been an extension of the theory of international trade to
situations of uncertainty. A major result has been that, if appropriate
risk sharing arrangements exist among domestic consumers and producers,
the traditional arguments in favor of free trade remain intact. For a
number of reasons, however, falling for the most part into the categories
of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection", domestic risk sharing
arrangements are likely to be incomplete. In such situations free trade
may no longer constitute optimal commercial policy.
The implications of incomplete insurance markets for the optimality
of competitive equilibrium have been explored by Hart (1975), Newbery and
Stiglitz (1981), and Comes and Mime (1981). Newbery and Stiglitz (1981)
have shown explicitly that trade intervention may be optimal when domestic
markets fail to allocate risks optimally. Commercial policy can act as a
partial substitute for insurance markets.
A number of trade theorists have recognized, at a somewhat informal
level, the role of commercial policy as insurance. See, in particular,
Corden (1974, pp. 320—321), Cassing (1980, pp. 396—397) and Baldwin(1981,
pp. 20—21). Quoting the last author:
Workers and capital owners who are risk—averse wish
to avoid human and physical capital losses due tosudden and
significant increases in imports that compete with thedomestic
products they produce. However, private markets toinsure against
this risk fail to exist, apparently for reasons of inadequatedata
or "moral hazard". The import relief legislation involvingrecoin—
mendations from the International Trade Commission can, for example,
be viewed as a means of providing the desired insurance (p.21).
In fact, some analysts have explained the existenceof tariffs as the—2—
manifestation of a social desire to providesuch insurance. See for exanple,
Corden (1974, p. 321)
While the role of commercial policy as asubstitute for insurance has
been recognized on both a theoretical and practicallevel, little has been
done to determine (1) conditions under whichintervention is desirable, (2)
the form that intervention should take,and (3) the optimal level of inter-
vention. The purpose of this paper is toaddress these issues in a frame-
work that is familiar to tradetheorists
In an economy in which all individuals haveidentical tastes, own
identical amounts of each factor of production,and can diversify their
factor endowments among activities, theissue of insurance does not
arise. Risk is spread equally amongall individuals, who are equally
willing to bear it. Any marketfor insurance will be inactive. Ifthere
are asymmetries either in tastes orin initial factor endowments, orelse
if individuals must completely specialize
their use of a factor in some
activity, a reallocation of riskis likely to be optimal. In this paper
we assume that ex ante, i.e.,before uncertainty is resolved, allindi-
viduals are identical in their tastesand factor endowments. Individuals
must, however, allocate theirendowment of one factor to a particular
activity before the actual termsof trade of the country are known.Ex
post, the terms of tradethat materialize will benefit someindividuals
relative to others. We thus focus oncommercial policy as a method to
insure Individuals against
unfavorable outcomes in the terms oftrade.
This insurance motive for trade interventionis distinct from a redistributive
ntive that would arise if workers differed intheir initial endowments or
in their attitudes toward work.
We consider a small, open economycharacterized by the standard
Ueckscher—Ohlin assumptionstwo factors of production, capitaland labor—3—
produce two traded commodities, both of which are consumed domestically.
Production of both commodities takes place under perfectly competitive con-
ditions. Following, for example, Rothenberg and Smith (1971) and Eaton
(1979), we assume that, at the time capital must be allocated between pro-
ductive activities, the terms of trade are unknown. Labor, unlike capital,
can move between the production of exportables and import substitutes after
the uncertainty is resolved. In the short—run, then, the model is equiva-
lent to the two—commodity, three factor Ricardo—Viner model analyzed exten-
sively by Jones (1971).2 Individuals have identical tastes and initial
endowments of labor and capital, but an individual must engage his capital
entirely in one activity or the other. This assumption may be justified
by the presence of indivisibilities and set—up costs that make specialization
highly efficient. For example, human capital is frequently most productive
when it takes the form of specialized training; an individual farm is usually
more productive when it produces a small number rather than a wide variety
of products.3
An individual's pre—tax income, then, is determined by the wage earned
by labor, which is the same for everyone, and the rate of return on capital,
which depends upon the activity in which it is engaged. Ex post, individuals
with capital in different sectors earn different incomes. We assume that
there is no market, such as an insurance or a stock market, in which agents
can trade claims to capital income across states of nature.4 We also assume
that redistribution via an income tax is infeasible, perhaps because of
transactions costs and evasion.
We do not attempt to explain the non—existence of optimal redistribution
methods, but assume it, appealing to the well—known reasons of moral hazard
and adverse—selection. See Arrow (1970) and Shavell (1979) for a discussion.—4—
We show, in this context, that an interventionist commercial policy in
general raises social welfare. Furthermore, when individuals anticipate the
policy when they make their capital allocation decisions, intervention is
Pareto—improving in the sense that it makes everyone's expected utility
higher, ex ante.
The main form of policy that we consider is import tariffs. We consider
a number of variations in institutional format of the tariff policy. As is
generally the case in models of optimal taxation, interesting comparative
static results are hard to come by for very general cases. For this reason
much of our analysis takes the form of simulations.
Section 2 sets forth the basic assumption of our model and simulation
analysis. In section 3 we show that intervention, in a number of variants,
is likely to be welfare improving. Section 4 examines the optimal level of
intervention and how it is affected by changes in (1) the amount of uncer-
tainty; (2) tastes; and (3) technology. Section 5 summarizes our major
conclusions.
While we examine a number of factors influencing optimal commercial
policy, three general results seem to emerge. One is that, as long as the
government budget must always beinbalance, the net effect of policy is
likely to favor import—competing industries relative to export industries;
i.e., there is an anti—trade bias to optimal policy. A second result is
that an increase in substitutability between commodities in consumption or
between factors in production is likely to diminish the optimal level of
intervention. Finally, tariffs may dominate production subsidies or taxes
as a maans of insuring against shifts in the terms of trade.—5—
2. The Model
We consider an economy that can produce two commodities, commodity 1
and commodity 2, with capital and labor. Outputs of the two commodities
in state of nature i are at levels X11 and x21, given by
(2.la) x11 =F1(K1,L") I =A,B
(2.lb)x2 =F2(K,L21) I =A,B
where K and L1 denote the amount of capital and labor, respectively, engaged
in producing commodity j in state i. The functions F are homogeneous of
degree one in K and L3 quasi—concave and twice—differentiable. Factor
allocation is subject to the constraints
(2.2a) K' + K2 <K
(2.2b) L + <L, I =A,B
where K and L represent the aggregate endowments of capital and labor. We
assume that each individual is endowed with one unit of labor and k units
of capital. We normalize the number of individuals to equal one. Thus
L1 and K =k.
We assign the international price of commodity 2 the role of numeraire
and denote the price of comndity 1 in state of nature i as P1. We assume,
for simplicity, that there are two states of nature, A and B, characterized by
>BWithout loss of generality (via the Lerner symmetry theorem) we
assume that tariff intervention takes the form of taxes or subsidies on—6—
imports of commodity 2. Thus the domestic price of commodity 2 in state
of nature i is 1 + t, where t1 is the ad valorem tariff rate in state of
nature i.
Since and L2 are determined after P1 and t1 are known, ignoring
corner solutions competition implies that
(2.3) w1 =P'F(K',
L1') =(1+ t1)F(K2, 1 —L11),0 <L"<1;i =A,B
where w1 denotes the wage in state of nature i. Here and
=Fk/Kj.Implicitly, the second part of (2.3) defines a labor allo-
cation function Lh1(P1, t', K', K2). The rates of return on capital in
sectors 1 and 2 are, respectively, given by
(2.4a) Rli =P'F(K1,L) I =A,B
(2.4b) =(1+ t1)F(K2, L2') i =A,B.
Individuals will have allocated capital either to one sector or the
other. The income of individual j,havingallocated his capital to sector
j,isthus, in state i,
(2.5) Yj R31k + w1 + T1 =1,2; i =A,B
were T1 denotes tariff revenue distributed to individual jinstate i.
Total tariff revenue is given by tiM1, where M denotes imports of commodity
2 in state i. We assume that this is distributed equally among all mdi—
.5 jiLi. vidualsin a lump—sum fashion.Thus T=tx'i, j = 1,2.—7—
In state i the utility of individual j is given by the indirect
utility function V(Y1, P1, 1 + t'). Consumption of commodity 2 by
individual j in state i, C, is given from Roy's identity, by
(2.6) C2 =— V1/V' =1,2; i =A,B
where V31 E V(Y31, P1, 1 + t'), V V31/3Y and V =V1/t'Imports
of commodity 2 in state i are thus
i 11 2 1• (2.7) M =AC+ (1 —A)C—F[(l—A)K,1—L'}; i=A,B
where AK1/K, the share of capital in sector 1 (i.e. exportables).
If capital is allocated to both sectors in positive amounts then the
expected utility of placing capital in one sector or the other must be the
same. Thus the condition
(2.8) E7r'(V— V2')=0,
where denotes the probability that PP1, i =A,B, must obtain in
equilibrium.
Together, conditions (2.1) —(2.8)constitute a system of 26 equations
ii 2iii2i1 2iii which determine equilibrium levels of X , X, L , L , K , K , w , R
R2', y'1' y21, C11, C21 and as functions of the capital endowment K,
the terms of trade P, the probabilities ii,andthe tariff rates t.
In our simulations we assume that the utility function and both pro-
duction functions are of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)—8--
form.Wealso assume constant relative risk aversion. The indirect
utility function can be shown to be of the form
+ 1 -a)_l/PY




Theproduction functions are given by
1 1Pi i—p1
(2.10) X =[cx1(K)+ (1-a1)(L)] 1
2 2 2 2 2 1/2
(2.11) X =[cz2(K)+ (1—cz2)(L) J
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In our simulations we set r ='ii= 1/2and, P =1+ u and P + 1/(1 + u).
We thus consider uncertainty in terms of a geometric mean preserving spread
around a price of one. Such a characterization has the virtue of being
insensitive to the choice of numeraire. See Fleimning, Turnovsky and Kemp (1977).
The following are theparaineter values that are used throughout most














Note that our parameter values imply a degree of relative risk aversion of
two, and elasticities of substitution in both consumption and production very
near unity. We also assume in our simulations that the prr' cct i
more capital intensive.
3. Optimal Tariff Intervention
We assume that the goal of policy is to maximize expected social
welfare, where welfare in any state i is the sum of all individuals' levels
of utility in that state. The social welfare function W may therefore be
defined by
(3.1) W + (1 —A)v21j
Insteady state it is reasonable to assume that intervention policy is
anticipated at the time capital is allocated. If the political environment
has changed, however, capital may have been allocated under the assumption
that free trade would always prevail. In this case unanticipated policies
may be implemented.
Anticipated policies are, of course, of greaterinterest than unanticipated
ones. We find it useful, however, to consider first the case in which
capital was allocated between sectors under the assumption that there would
be no intervention. For this case we can ignore the effects of the policy
on the allocation of capital. We introduce a capital—allocation effect
subsequently.— 10—
3.1Optimal Unanticipated Tariff Policy
Even when intervention has no effect on the allocation of capital, a
policy of free trade is not optimal. Appropriate intervention transfers
income toward the group with the higher marginal utility of income in each
state of nature. To dennstrate the desirability of intervention we first
show the following results:
Result 1: An increase in the tariff on commodity 2 shifts labor from sector
1 to sector 2, given the allocation of capital.




(3.2) = L <0
dt' l + (1 + t1)FL
Result 2: An increase in the tariff on commodity 2 distributes income away
from individuals with capital in sector 1 toward thosewith capital in sec-
tor 2, given the allocation of capital.
i_ 2i 11
This follows from differentiating Y =Y —Ywhere, from (2.5),
(3.3) d(Y1) ={4(K2,
1 -L)-[(1 + t1)F + piFl)dL
dt1 dt
which, since F >0,is positive.
Analogously, an increase in P, the price of commodity 1,shifts labor
from sector 2 to sector 1, and distributes income from individualswith
capital in sector 2 (type 2 individuals) to thosewith capital in sector
1 (type 1 individuals). It is therefore the case that, inthe absence of
tariffs, type1individuals have relatively higher incomes when P =— 11—
i.e.,that lA —2A>1B—2BSince the expected utility from engaging
capital in the two sectors must be equal, we must have either >v
and V <v2E,or the converse. As all individuals face the same commodity
prices, differences in utility between individuals in a given state
derive solely from differences in income. Since type 1 individuals have
relatively higher income in state A it must be that V >v2Awhile
lB 2B lÀ 2A . lB 2B V <Vand that Y >Ywhile Y <Y type 1 individuals earn
absolutely more income when P = andconversely when P =P1.
To show that a nonzero tariff is optimal we differentiate W with respect
to t, holding K1 and K2 constant, and evaluate the resulting expression at
=0.Using the derivative of the equilibrium condition (2.3) with respect






Consider first the case i =A.Since >2Adiminishing marginal
2A lÀ d(LY') utility of income implies that V. >V
.From(3.3) is positive.
dt
Finally, if commodity 2 is non—inferior, >C.Thus all the terms in
expression (3.4) are positive. From a position of free trade imposing a
small positive tariff raises social welfare.
The tariff distributes incomes from individuals with a low marginal
utility of income (type l's) to individuals for whom the marginal utility
of income is high (type 2's). It does so in two ways. First, because the
tariff raises the relative producer price of commodity 2, it transfers in-
come from type 1 to type 2 individuals, via result 2. Second, because the
tariff raises the consumer price of commodity 2 above the world price, it— 12—
taxesconsumption of commodity 2. The higher income group (type 1) pays
moreofthe tax since they consume more of commodity 2. Since tax revenue
is distributed as a poll tax, the result is a transfer to the group with
lower income.
lB 2B 2B lB
Consider next the case i =B.Since Y <Y ,V
<V,and, because
of noninferiority, <c2B.Thus (3.4) is ambiguous in sign. The effect
of the tariff on producer prices tends to make an import subsidy optimal,
since a subsidy transfers income toward type 1 individuals. But an import
subsidy also lowers the consumer price of commodity2, which tends to
benefittype 2 individuals, who consume relatively more commodity2. For
thisreason the sign of expression (3.4) is ambiguous.
Welfare improving commercial policy thus requires a tariff on imports of
commodity 2 when the world price of commodity 2 is below mean, but may require
either an import subsidy or a tariff when the price is above mean,.The
effect of a positive tariff on consumer prices is always to transfer income
toward the lower income group. There is thus some reason to think that
optimal intervention, on average, will tend to reduce the average amount of
trade. This presumption was supported by our simulation analysis, in which
we found that the optimal tariff, when the price of commodity 1 was high,
was in every case as large or larger in absolute value than the optimal
import subsidy when the terms of trade were unfavorable. The optimal tariffs
as well as the share of the capital stock invested in sector 1 are reported
in Table 3.1. We note once again that because the policies we are considering
here were unanticipated when capital was allocated between sectors, the
optimal tariffs in Table 3.1 need not Pareto—dominate free trade; policy
maylowerthe expected utility of individuals in one sector or the other.
It is true, however, that some set of state—contingent tariff rates can
be found such that each type of individual benefits in anex ante (i.e.
expected utility) sense.— 13—
3.2Anticipated, Time—Consistent Tariff Policy
We now consider how policy is modified when its effects on capital
allocation are taken into account. A problem that arises in this context is
that, at the time tariffs are actually imposed, the capital stock is fixed
in place. The commercial policy that maximizes social welfare from the
perspective of the period in which the policy is implemented can ignore its
effects on the allocation of capital, which at that point is a bygone.
Policy makers may wish to affect the allocation of capital in the previous
period by announcing policies that affect capital allocation in the direction
desired. But once the capital has been allocated, policy makers will
typically have an incentive to deviate from the announced policy.
Unless policy makers have a means of constraining themselves to policies
that were announced previously, they will pursue policies that are optimal
from the perspective of the period in which they are implemented. These
are referred to as time—consistent policies. If individuals are rational
in forming their expectations, these are the policies that they anticipate
when deciding where to invest their endowment of capital.
In this section we consider time—consistent policies. In the sections
that follow we assume, instead, that policy makers are able to precommit
themselves credibly to policies at the time that capital is allocated
between sectors, and actually pursue the policies announced. We refer to
these as optimal, anticipated policies.8
Since time—consistent policy takes the allocation of capital as given
it is formulated according to the same principle as unanticipated policy.
Thus expression (3.4) also indicates the direction that time—consistent
intervention will take. Individuals now, however, anticipate the policies
that are in fact pursued, rather than free trade, when making their invest-
ment decisions. Therefore the equilibrium condition (2.8) now applies to— 14—
expectedutilities under time—consistent policy rather than under free
trade. The difference between optimal unanticipated policy and time—
consistent, anticipated policy is that the second affects the allocation
of capital while the first does not.
Anticipated, time consistent tariffs for our base case are reported
in Table 3.2. Note that, as with optimal unanticipated policy, there is
an anti—trade bias: there is always a higher tariff rate in state A than
subsidy in state B. Comparing this table with Table 3.1 note that the
effect of intervention is always to shift capital into sector 2, the import—
competing sector. The two tables also show that, for our base case, whether
policy is unanticipated or anticipated and time—consistent, trade intervention
offsets roughly one—third of the variability in international prices.
3.3 Optimal Anticipated Tariff Policy
We now consider optimal commercial policy when the government can
commit itself credibly to a particular policy before capital is allocated
between sectors. The government may bind itself legally to a particular
response, or else it may act out of concern for the effect of its current
policies on its future reputation.9
As in the previous cases we considered,a small positive tariff when
the terms of trade are favorable is welfare improving, while a welfare
improving small deviation from free trade in the state with unfavorable
terms of trade may involve either a tariff or an import subsidy.
To see this, consider first commercial policy in state of nature A.
The first derivative of the welfare function with respect to tA, evaluated
at =tB=0,is given by— 15—
dtA
A(lA){rA(V2A-VA)[:9+ (CiA-c2I
B 1 B 2BlB Y dK
+r(V -V)[ 1K dt
2AJA lB 2B Since V > andV.1 >V,
,atariff (subsidy) can only be welfare improving
if either the expression in the first square bracket on the r.h.s. is positive
(negative)or the expression in the second square bracket is negative (positive).
It is straightforward tOshowthat the first bracketed expression is positive
LA 2AA
if and only ifd(V—V)/dt <0,i.e. ifatariff in state of nature A
increases the relative utility of type 2 individuals in that state. Similarly,
the second bracketed expression is negative if and only if d(V —v2B)/dtA>o.
But note that a fully anticipated commercial policy cannot, in equilibrium,
raise the relative utility level of the same group of capital owners in both
states of nature, since expected utilities must remain equal. Therefore,
d(VLA —v2A)/dtA<0<>d(V—v2B)/dtA>0,and thus a tariff (subsidy)
is welfare improving only if both the first bracketed expression is positive
(negative) and the second bracketed expression is negative (positive). We
will show that the conditions for an import subsidy to be welfare improving
lead to a contradiction.
Suppose that an import subsidy in state of nature A were welfare improving.
We know from (3.3) that >0,and if importables are non—inferior
—C>0.Evaluating the effect of a change inK' on the income dif—
erential we obtain
(3.6) = +(1 + t)F + [P1F +(1+ ti)F11), I =A,B.— 16—
From(2.3)
11 i 2




Substituting (3.7) into (3.6) yields an expression that is positive (since
the determinant of the Jacobian of a two—factor constant returns production
function is zero).
Thus, if the first bracketed expression in (3.5) is to be negative,
dKl/dtA must be negative. However, this would imply that the second bracketed
expression in (3.5) is also negative, which violates the equilibrium condition
requiring that the total effect of a commercial policy be to transfer utility
in opposite directions in the two states of nature. Hence, we conclude that
dW/dtA >0,i.e. that a fully anticipated small tariff when terms of trade
are favorable increases social welfare.'0 It does so directly by transfering
income to type 1 individuals in state A, and indirectly, via the capital
reallocation, by transfering income to type 2 individuals in state B.
Turning now to optimal policy in state B, we have an expression analogous
to (3.5) for dW/dtB and we can apply exactly the same reasoning to conclude
that a small welfare—improving policy in state B must cause capital to
reallocate to sector I, so that type 2 individuals benefit in state A. And
similarly, In equilibrium intervention must benefit type 1 individuals in
state B. As in the unanticipated and time—consistent cases, this may involve
either a tax or a subsidy. Again there is a presumption that optimal policy
has an anti—trade bias, since the effect of an import tariff, as opposed to
an import subsidy, on consumer prices is to transfer income from the high
income to the low income group.
Our simulation results for this case are presented in Table 3.3.— 17—
Comparingthis table with Table 3.2 note that time—consistent andoptimal
anticipated policies are virtually identical. At the three—digit level of
accuracy of our calculations we can discern differences only when the
degree of price variation reaches 35 per cent. For this case optimal policy
requires a slightly higher subsidy to the export sector when the terms of
trade are unfavorable. The share of capital allocated to the export sector
is consequently larger: when policy makers take into account the effects
of their policies on capital allocation, they reduce the anti—trade bias of
intervention, but only very slightly. The share of capital allocated to
the export sector is still much lower than what it is if individuals
anticipate free trade. We conclude the major channel through which optimal
anticipated intervention raises social welfare is not through its effect
on capital allocation.
3.4 Optimal One—State Tariffs
The tariff authority may find itself constrained to set tariffs only
at non—negative rates: import subsidies, which require that revenue be
raised via a poll tax, may be politically infeasible. If, in fact, a
non—negative tariff is optimal in both states, this constraint is not
binding. Otherwise, the optimal tariff in state B will equal zero while
the tariff in state A will be modified. Optimal state A tariffs, when
=0,are presented in Table 3.4. The optimal tariff in state A is
always lower than in the unconstrained case, but the net effect on capital
allocation is much larger: when commercial policy is constrained to non—
negative tariff rates it results in shifting more capital to the import--
competing sector than otherwise; the anti—trade bias is stronger.—18—
3.5 Non—State Contingent Tariffs
So far we have assumed that tariff rates may depend upon the terms of
trade that materialize. This assumption is appropriate to situations in
which (i) policy makers are very flexible or (ii) variation in the terms
of trade is of rather low frequency. If neither condition is met a state—
contingent policy may in fact be infeasible. A policy of imposing a tariff
at a fixed rate still dominates free trade, however. To illustrate this
result we differentiate the social welfare function T. with respect to
_A B t —t=t,andevaluate the resuiting expression at t0, to obtain
(3.8) = — —vli)['
+ —c21n
1 2i 1, . .dY Since (V —V
)reversessign while dt >0,i=A,B the sign of the
2ii.
expression is ambiguous. However, since the sign of (V —) is,if
commodity 2 is non—inferior, always equal to the sign of(C1' —C2'),there
are three positive and one negative terms. A tariff at a positive level
will, via its effect on consumer prices, always transfer income from the
rich to the poor. The effect on producer prices is, of course, always to
transfer income from type 1 to type 2 individuals. Our simulations for
this case, presented in table 3.5, do, in fact, always indicate that a
small, positive tariff is optimal. Once again, optimal policy has an
anti—trade bias.
3.6 Production Taxes/Subsidies vs. Commercial Policy
A policy of taxing or subsidizing production can affect producer
prices while allowing consumers to buy commodities at world prices.If
taxes/subsidies can he state contingent a welfare—improving ad valoreni
subsidy s1 to sector 1 in state i has the sign of— 19—
(3.9) =A(l-A)7r(V
-vj)
ds 1=0 j=A,B ds'
dLY3dZY
where = .Optimalpolicy will necessarily require a subsidy on
ds dt
sector 2 output in state A and a tax in state B. Table 3.6 presents optimal
subsidies and taxes (defined as negative subsidies) to sector 2, the import—
competing sector.
If a state—contingent tax/subsidy scheme is infeasible, the optimal




While there is less presumption that this magnitude is positive, a non—zero
dYAdYB
value is still likely. One reason is that in general. A given
subsidy rate may transfer more income in one state than in the other.
Another reason is that the condition ETr(V2 —V1)=0does not necessarily
imply that Er(V —V)
=o)'
Economists often recommend taxes and subsidies over tariffs as a means
of correcting domestic factor market imperfections because they effect only
producer prices, leaving consumer decisions undistored. This effect operates
in favor of a production tax/subsidy policy in our context as well. A
factor operating in the other direction, however, is the effect of a tariff,
via its impact on consumer prices, to redistribute income from the rich to
the poor in either state of nature. Our simulations indicate that, in fact,
a policy of imposing taxes and subsidies on trade mayParetodominate a— zu—
policythat imposes taxes and subsidies on production, especially when the
elasticity of substitution in consumption is low.
3.7 Stochastically Balanced Budget
So far in our discussion we have assumed that, in each state of nature,
tariff or tax revenue is redistributea equally to all individuals in a lump—
sum fashion or, alternatively, that a poll tax is imposed tofinance an import
or production subsidy. Such poll taxes and subsidies might notbe feasible
policies. The government may, however, be able to borrow and lend in inter-
national capital markets so that the budget need only be in balance on
average. e consider optimal tariff policywhen Poll taxes are infeasible,
but when the government is constrained to balance the budget onlyin an
expected sense ,facingthe constraint,
(3.11) [1T1t'(C1 -F1].
Our simulations, presented in Table 3.7, still indicate that a tax onimports
is optimal when i =A,while a subsidy is optimal when I =B.The optimal
import subsidy in state B is now, however,much larger than the optimal
tariff in state A: it is optimal for the government to run a budgetdeficit
when the terms of trade are unfavorable, giving out largersubsidies, and
to run a surplus urtderfavorable terms of trade. In this way the government
smooths out the effect of terms of trade fluctuations onincome. The conse-
quence of such a policy is to attractcapital to the export sector. The
rest of the world, through government borrowingand lending, Is acting to
insure the entire economy against
fluctuations in its terms of trade. It
is optimal for individuals to behave in a morerisk neutral fashion, and to
specialize more in producing the export good.— 21—
4.Sensitivity Analysis
-
Insection 3 we established that, when domestic risk sharing arrangements
are incomplete, an interventionist commercial policy is generally welfare
improving. We characterized optimal intervention under various institutional
arrangements for a given set of parameter values. In this section we
restrict ourselves to commercial policy that involves taxes or subsidies on
(i) imports, where tariff rates (ii) are anticipated, (iii) are state—
contingent, (iv) may be positive or negative and (v) are subject to a
balanced—budget constraint in each state. We assume that policy makers
can credibly commit themselves to their actual policies before investment
decisions are made. We analyze how optimal intervention changes with changes
in tastes and technology.
4.1 Risk Aversion
We calculated optimal tariffs for the values of y indicated in Table
4.1, holding other parameters at the levels given in section 2, and setting
u =.25.Note that if individuals are risk neutral (y =1),free trade is
optimal. Optimal intervention rises with the degree of relative risk aver-
sion R, (whereR =1—y),as does the share of capital allocated to the
import—competing sector.
4.2 Elasticity of Substitution in Consumption
We calculated optimal tariffs for the values of p given in Table 4.2.
As the elasticity of substitution rises falls), the optimal tariff
rates fall in absolute value, as does the share of capital allocated to
the export sector. As substitutability between the two goods rises, so
does the distortion implied by a given level of tariff protection. Thus— 22—
theoptimal tariff falls as rises. In contrast to the effect of varying
the risk aversion parameter y, large changes in have rather insignificant
effects on the optimal tariff rates.
4.3 The Share of Exports in Consumption
As Table 4.3 indicates, as the imported good comes to occupy a larger
share of expenditures (c falls) the optimal tariff becomes smaller in
absolute value. As the share of imports in consumption becomes larger, a
given reallocation of income can be obtained with a smaller tariff rate.
4.4 The Elasticity of Substitution in Production
As p1 and p2 fall, (implying higher values of and 02) the optimal
tariff falls, while the share of capital allocated to the export sector
grows. These results are reported in Table 4.4. As productionbecomes
more elastic, re labor is transferred between sectors in response to the
state of nature. A given tariff therefore has a greater distorting effect
on production. Thus the optimal tariff rate falls as o and 02 rise.
Greater substitutability between factors acts, also, to reduce the effects
of terms of trade variations on the returns to capital, thereby providing
an insurance effect. The optimal amount of capital allocated to the ex-
port sector therefore rises as technology becomes moreelastic)2 Note
that changing the elasticity of substitution in production has amuch more
pronounced effect on the optimal tariff rates than does changing theelas—
ticity of substitution in consumption.
4.5 Capital Shares
Reducing the capital shares cz1 and cx2 reduces the optimal amountof
tariff intervention, as shown in Table 4.5. The reason is that as the— 23—
shareof the mobile factor (labor) rises, so does the ex post flexibility
of the economy. The distortion implied by a given tariff rises. At the
same time the wage is higher relative to capital income. The overall
differences in income between the two types of individuals becomes lower.
For this reasons we found that reducing a, and a2, but holding a1/cx2 con-
stant, increases the share of capital allocated to the export sector.
4.6 The Capital —Labor Ratio
As we raise the capital—labor ratio, the optimal level of protection
also rises, as reported in Table 4.6. The reason is that as this magni-
tude rises, so does the share of capital income in total income. Differ-
ences in income between the two types of individuals across states of
nature are consequently larger. The share of capital allocated to the
export sector also rises with the total capital—labor ratio, aswould be
expected from Rybczynski Theorem considerations.
5. Conclusion
We have shown how in an economy in which agents must specialize in
their use of a factor endowments, and in which domestic risk sharing
arrangements are incomplete, departures from free trade are likely tobe
welfare improving even for a small, open economy. We emphasize, however,
that an interventionist commercial policy constitutes a second best
solution. A first best policy would redistribute income directlywithout
distorting consumer or producer prices. In our simple model a tax on
income would serve this purpose. Problems of evasion may make anincome
tax difficult to administer, however, especially in aless developed
country where much domestic economic activitytakes place outside the mar-
ket. For this reason commercial policy may be the onlyavailable method
of pooling risk.— 24—
- Ourresults maybecompared with Johnson's (1965) and Bhagwati's (1971)
analysis of commercial policy in the presence of other domestic market un—
perfections such as factor market distortions. Here as well an interven-
tionist commercial policy is not the first best means of correcting the
distortion, but if other instruments are not available then free trade is
not optimal.
Finally, we note that in this paper we have restricted ourselves to
consider the terms of trade as the source of uncertainty. Uncertainty
may also arise in domestic preferences and technologies.The essential
arguments that we have made here are not affected if the sourceof uncer-
tainty changes. We performed a number of simulations in whichthe source
of uncertainty was a multiplicative disturbance term in the production
function of the exportable good. No results emerged that were qualitatively
different from what we report above.FOOTNOTES
1.Eaton and Rosen (1980a, 1980b) examine the implications of incomplete
wage insurance markets for optimal income tax policy. In their model,
however, all private risk is eliminated at the aggregate level by the
law of large numbers. When uncertainty arises from the terms of trade
it is aggregate risk which is not diversifiable.
2.Grossman (1981) develops a model which allows for gradations of inter—
sectoral factor mobility, in constrast to the sharp distinction between
perfect mobility and perfect immobility we draw here. As long as some
degree of immobility is present, the basic implications of our analysis
remain intact.
3. See Grossman and Shapiro (1981) for a model that endogenizes the
efficiency gains from specialization in sector—specific training.
4.If perfect insurance markets existed, the outcome would be identical
to the one that would obtain if individuals could divide their capital
between activities. It is this essential indivisibility of capital, as
well as its immobility, that leads to a suboptimal allocation of risk.
It is in assuming that capital is indivisible that our analysis here
differs from that in Eaton (1979). This second model assumes that the
representative individual can divide his capital between activities.
The optimality of free trade follows.
5.Note that "tariff revenue" maybenegative. In such cases the import
subsidy is financed by a poil tax.
6.The derivation of (3.4) is provided in the appendix.
7.Strictly speaking, this statement is necessarily true only for small
deviations from free trade. Globally optimal policies could possibly
be opposite in sign to small, welfare—improving policies if there are
strong interactions between the welfare effect of a trade policy in a
given state and the distortion caused by the non—infinitesimal deviation
from free trade in the opposite state. We found no examples of such
reversals in our simulations, however.
8.Kydland (l977)defines a policy that (1) is time—consistent and (ii)
responds to current information about the state of the economy as the
feedback solution to the government's control problem. A policy
response that (1) is optimal from the perspective of an initial period
prior to the period of implementation but (ii) responds to current
information is the closed ioop solution. The open loop solution
(i) is optimal from the perspective of an initial period prior to the
period of implementation and (ii) depends only on information available
at that initial period. According to this nomenclature this section
treats feedback commercial policy. In section 3.3 we consider closed
loop policy while open loop policy is taken up in section 3.5
9. Dybvig and Spatt (1980) model the reputation phenomenon formally for a
firm concerned with its reputation for product quality. They find that
time—consistent policy in general lies between the feedback policy
when there is no reputation effect and the closed—loop policy.10. Since expected utilities are equal an increase in social welfarefor
an anticipated policy is equivalent to an increase in expected utility
of the representative individual.
11. This relationship is, however, implied by constant absolute risk
aversion.
12. The last result also appeared in Eaton's (1979) one—individual model.REFERENCES
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Table 3.1
Optimal Unanticipated Tariff Rates
U
.15 .06 —.06 .671
.25 .09 —.09 .690
.35 .13 —.12 .709
Table 3.2
Anticipated Time Consistent Tariff Rates
A B 1
U t t
.15 .06 —.05 .642
.25 .10 —.08 .633
.35 .14 —.10 .613
Table 3.3
Optimal Anticipated Tariff Rates
A B
U t t
.15 .06 —.05 .642
.25 .10 —.08 .633
.14 —.11 .627
Table 3.4
Optimal One—State Tariff Rates
A B
U t t
.15 .03 0 .616
.25 .06 0 .585
.35 .08 0 .579Table 3.5










.15 .08 —.07 .656
.25 .13 —.10 .649
.35 .19 —.13 .638
Table 3.7
Optimal Tariffs with a Stochastically Balanced Budget
A B 1
u t t K
.15 .12 —.149 .733
.25 .30 —.332 .862
.30* .36 —.469 .99
*At u.35 complete specialization occurred.Table 4.1
Variations in Risk Aversion
•y(R1 —y)
1.0 0.0 0.0 .714
.01 .06 —.05 .667
—1.0 .10 —.08 .633
—2.0 .13 —.10 .60S
-9.0 .21 -.13 .522
Table 4.2
Variations in the Elasticity of Substitution in Consumption
=
1
100.00 .12 —.10 .663
0.50 .11 —.09 .642
0.01 .10 —.08 .633
—0.33 .10 —.08 .621
—0.50 .10 —.08 .613
Table 4.3
Variations in the Share of Exports in Consumption
A B 1
a t t K
C
0.5 .11 —.09 .614
0.25 .10 —.08 .633
0.1 .10 —.08 .665Table 4.4
Variations in the Elasticity of Substitution in Production
1 A = = =+)t
4.00 .15 —.13 .447
0.50 .12 —.10 .566
0.01 .10 —.08 .633
—0.33 .07 —.06 .735
—0.50 .05 —.04 .806
—0.67 .02 —.02 .903
Table 4.5
Variations in Capital Shares
A B
t t K
.75 .5 .14 —.12 .583
.75 .25 .10 —.08 .743
.5 .25 .10 —.08 .633
.1 .05 .03 —.01 .676
Table 4.6
Variations in the Capital—Labor Ratio
1
K ElK
1.15 .10 —.09 .748
1.0 .10 —.08 .633
0.85 .09 —.07 .500Appendix: Derivation of Equation (3.4)
To derive expression (3.4) in the text we first differentiate the
social welfare function W with respect to t to obtain:
(A.1) —I= ir {A[V


















Since we consider deviations from an initial situation of the free trade we
set
(A.4) t =0From (2.3)
dw' I ii :1i
(A.5) =PFLL Lt
and also





Euler's theorem implies that





(A.8) =AC1'+ (l—A)C —F2'
Substituting (A.3) through (A.8) into (A.2) and(A.2') gives
dY1' A ii
____ Ldw






dt'1 —— (A••L)+AC + (1 —X)C2'—F2'
Substituting (A.9), (A.9') and Roy's identity (2.6) into (A.1) we obtain
(A 10)
dW — j ')[(A-Ll1)




ii rii A1AC + (1 —A)C2'—C11]
+ V'(1 —A)[AC1'+ (1 —X)C2'—ca))
Rearranging we get
L' dw'
(A.11) I = i{x\r11[(A
dt'
+ AC1 + (1 —A)C2'—F2'—C1']
2i 21 A—L'dw'
-3-(1—A)V [F /(iA)+(i_x) dt






+ A(1 —A)(V —v)(C2'
-C1')—X(V1
—
V1)F21](A.11") = - V)A(l-A)E(1:x)
+ F2'/(l —A)+ (dl —C21)]
From (A.9) and (A.9') we have





Substituting (A.12) into (A.11") yields expression (3.4). Expression (3.5),
(3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) may be obtained via a similar set of substitutions.